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Abstract
In this paper, we question whether there is a catch-up eﬀect or announcement ef-
fect in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the European Union (EU) to the ten
EU accession countries. We study FDI outflows from the Netherlands, a small open
economy with few historical ties to Eastern Europe, and compare FDI in the transi-
tion countries in Central and Eastern Europe to FDI in other regions - most notably
to transition countries in Central Asia. In our analysis we try to impose as little
structure as possible on the data and allow for heterogeneity within the diﬀerent
regions. In an eﬀort to improve on past studies in the same area, we use a very broad
sample of countries, we present country-specific results and test how robust regional
dummies are, we check for omitted variable bias and we try to correct for possible
non-linearity in the gravity relationships. We find that many of the diﬀerences in
results of previous studies can be attributed to these specification problems. There
is no evidence that an overall catch-up eﬀect or announcement eﬀect exists. Rather,
economic fundamentals explain diﬀerences in inward investment in the region. FDI
and trade are mostly complementary and there is no evidence that there is crowding
out between regions.
Key words: gravity model, foreign direct investment, Eastern Europe
JEL classification: F02, F21, O16, O18, P34, R58
1 This paper was written when Jaap Bos was working at the Supervision Depart-
1 Introduction
In the years 1989 and 1990, most of the countries in Central and Eastern
Europe and Central Asia started the transition from communist states to
market economies. Liberalizing markets, allowing foreign goods and services
to enter the market either through trade or direct investments, was one of the
major aspects of transition.
Soon after the start of this transition, it became clear that there was a large
deviation in the amounts of direct investment received by the various transi-
tion countries; a few countries receive a large proportion of the total inflows
whereas most other countries in the region received very low amounts of For-
eign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows. Although many studies show that the
size of the FDI inflows can largely be explained by a limited number of basic
country characteristics (cf. Brenton et al., 1999), the question remains whether
FDI flows to these transition countries can be explained in the same manner.
Specifically, an announcement eﬀect or a catch-up eﬀect may explain the rel-
atively high FDI flows to those transition counties that have been selected for
accession in the European Union (EU).
In this paper, we study FDI flows to the ten European Union (EU) accession
countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC). 2 We try to find out why
some transition economies receive relatively more FDI than other countries.
In addition, we ask if the investment flows can be explained by the degree of
economic reform or development of the respective countries, or whether the
EU accession countries have received a preferential treatment from EU firms
that cannot be explained by economic fundamentals.
There are several important reasons for studying these investment flows. First,
the more integrated the EU accession countries are with the EU, the smoother
the accession to the EU is expected to be. Second and somewhat counter to the
ment of De Nederlandsche Bank. We thank Allard Bruinshoofd, Ralph de Haas, Jan
Kakes, Ben Kriechel, Iman van Lelyveld, Chris de Neubourg, Gerard Pfann and sem-
inar participants at De Nederlandsche Bank for their comments. We also thank De
Nederlandsche Bank and specifically Danny van de Kommer and Hans Ammerlaan
for constructing and providing this excellent database. The usual disclaimer applies.
The views expressed in this article are personal and do not necessarily reflect those
of De Nederlandsche Bank.
2 Since the focus is on transition countries, there are only 10 countries included
as E.U. accession countries, of which eight countries are joining the E.U. in 2004
(Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic
and Slovenia) and two countries are still negotiating E.U. accession (Bulgaria and
Romania). The remaining three countries joining the E.U. or negotiating (Cyprus,
Malta and Turkey) are not in transition from a socialist state to a market economy
and thus not considered as E.U. accession country in this chapter.
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previous argument, those accession countries that currently experience levels
of investment flows below what is expected, stand to gain the most from fu-
ture EU accession. Third, the stage of and relative position in the accession
process influence net investment flows to the diﬀerent countries entering the
EU. Fourth, a medium- to long-term catch-up eﬀect of the transition countries
needs to be financed. There is ample evidence in both the more theoretically
oriented growth literature (see Barro (1997) for an overview) and the more
empirically oriented research into the finance-growth nexus (De Haas (2002),
Szanyi (1998), EBRD Transition Report (1999), Borenszstein, de Gregorio
and Lee (1998)) that significant well-allocated investments are crucial to a
country’s ability to structurally enhance its economic growth. At the same
time, there is evidence (Koivu (2002), Bonin and Wachtel (2000) and Pis-
sarides (2001)) that the financial system that serves to facilitate and channel
investments is still underdeveloped in (most of) the transition countries. FDI
can play a very important role in providing these countries with the necessary
investment money. Finally, whereas research of trade flows is frequently un-
dertaken, studies on FDI flows are still relatively rare for Central and Eastern
Europe.
In this study, we try control for three common problems that have plagued
these studies. First, we try to avoid selection bias. Although we focus on ac-
cession countries in Central and Eastern Europe, we also include transition
countries in Central Asia in particular and a broad sample of other countries
in general. Second, we try to avoid omitted variable bias. We do not limit
ourselves to the standard set of variables used in comparable studies. Instead,
we collect a large database with economic, geographic, religious and cultural
variables that can explain diﬀerences in investment inflows and can help con-
trol for country-specific eﬀects and study country-by-country results. Third,
we try to avoid possible misspecification of our model by allowing for possi-
ble nonlinearity in the relation between our explanatory variables and FDI,
respectively.
In order to see whether there indeed is a split between advanced and less
advanced transition countries, we use FDI outflows from the Netherlands, a
small, open EU economy with no historical ties to the CEE region. Dutch
foreign direct investment outflow constitutes on average 7.22 percent of its
GDP over the period 1987-2001 and 12.57 percent in 2001 and is directed to-
wards a large number of countries. 3 Central and Eastern Europe and Central
Asia jointly received only 3,8 percent of the total Dutch FDI stock in 2002.
However, the region currently receives a larger share of Dutch FDI than can
be expected based on their 2002 FDI stock. In 2003, these countries received
8,2 percent of the Dutch outward FDI. The database we use consists of a bal-
anced panel of FDI flows to 207 countries over the period 1987-2001, as well
3 Sources: DNB and the OECD.
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as 1987 FDI stocks. These data are matched with a large, unbalanced panel
of economic and socio-political data from other sources. 4 We use the result-
ing unbalanced panel and take a general-to-specific approach in our empirical
section.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, the scope
and depth of the data set allow us to expand beyond the standard gravity
model considerably. It includes FDI determinants for a large group of 207
countries, over a relatively long period of 15 years. In addition, the analysis is
not limited to basic macroeconomic fundamentals, but takes into account other
factors that influence the distribution of FDI flows. The second contribution
to the literature is that we present simple methods to correct some important
recurring problems that can bias this type of study.
The remainder of this paper continues as follows. In section 2, we present the
standard gravity model, discuss recent advances with respect to the estima-
tions of gravity models and elaborate on a number of inherent problems with
the standard gravity model. Section 3 contains an overview of studies that have
applied this model to Central and Eastern Europe. In section 4, we describe
our data. Section 5 contains the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Methodology
In this section, we describe our workhorse model for analyzing whether or not
the transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe receive a proportional
share of Dutch FDI when compared to transition countries in Central Asia
and the rest of the world. We start with a critical discussion of the standard
gravity model. Subsequently, we introduce a comprehensive way to solve some
of the problems often encountered when estimating this model. In trying to
present solutions to these problems we always opt for the simplest possible
method, in line with the highly applied nature of the gravity model.
FDI flows are generally volatile and diﬀer significantly between countries and
over time. The gravity model is often used in order to explain some of this high
variance observed in the FDI flows. The basic gravity model was developed
in the 1960s to explain bilateral trade flows from a home country i to host
country j (Linneman (1966), Bikker (1982 & 1987), Morsink (1997), Brenton
et al. (1999)). The concept of gravity refers to the forces that are expected
to, over time, bring actual FDI flows in line with expected flows. The gravity
model is of a highly applied nature. Much of its success can be attributed to its
remarkable predictive power and its intuitive appeal. The latter can be seen
from the basic gravity equation (applied to FDI and in line with Deardorﬀ
4 IMF, World Bank, Euroscope, Euromoney, CIA.
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(1995)):
FDIij = Aij ∗ ((GDPi ∗GDPj) /Distij) (1)
where FDIij is the actual FDI flow from home country i to host country j;
GDPi is the actual GDP of the home country; GDPj is the actual GDP of the
host county; Distij is distance between the home country i and host country
j.
This equation is a long-run equilibrium condition and in the long run we
expect FDˆIij = FDIij. In the short run, however, this equilibrium condition
does not have to hold. Hence, if FDˆIij > FDIij a country receives less FDI
than expected based on the gravity variables, and if FDˆI < FDIij a country
receives more FDI than expected. The model is multiplicative in order to
ensure that as GDPi (or GDPj) approaches zero, so does FDIij. Thus, in this
basic model GDPi and GDPj measure the relative potential to invest. Second
order eﬀects from GDPi and GDPj are negative. It also follows that Distij ,
the distance between countries i and j, is always strictly positive. Finally,
the model includes a proportionality vector Aij. When applied to predict FDI
flows, population size of both home and host country are often included as
variables in Aij, assuming larger populations support and attract larger FDI
flows:
FDIij = Aij ∗ (POPi ∗ POPj) ∗ ((GDPi ∗GDPj) /Distij) (2)
where FDIij increases with GDPi and GDPj. In the basic model, we assume
that the population of the home and host country are the only two proportion-
ality variables included. Therefore Aij becomes a constant A, and the basic
model can be rewritten as:
FDIij = A ∗ (POPi ∗GDPi) ∗ (POPj ∗GDPj) ∗ (1/Distij) (3)
Now FDI flows are defined as a function of per capita GDP in two countries and
the distance between these countries. Since is equal for all host countries and
thus cannot explain deviations over countries, the term is dropped. 5 When
taking logs, we now estimate:
lnFDIij = β0 + β1 lnGDPj + β2 lnPOPj − β3 lnDistij + εij (4)
A simple constant β0 and the population in the host country now capture
proportionality. The gravity model predicts that the coeﬃcients β1 and β2 are
positive, since investments are expected to be larger if the host market is larger
and more developed. Distance can have a negative eﬀect, since countries that
5 GDPi/POPi is not constant over time, but there is no deviation with respect
to the various host countries, thus it can not be a source of explanation for FDI
deviations to those host countries.
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are farther apart are likely to have larger economic and cultural diﬀerences
thus making FDI less attractive. However, distance can also have a positive
eﬀect, since an increase in distance means that trade (through an increase
in transportation costs) becomes more expensive and is substituted by FDI.
Distance itself is then both geographical and psychic distance. 6 Therefore,
the coeﬃcient can be either positive or negative depending on which eﬀect
dominates.
Generally, studies using the gravity model can suﬀer from various problems:
in this paper we try to deal with sample bias, omitted variable bias and non-
linearity
2.1 Sample bias
In terms of the model we just outlined, what is the optimal size of j? In
estimating a model of this nature, we face a trade-oﬀ between broadening the
sample to include more countries and risking incorrect inferences as a result of
inappropriate pooling of countries that are structurally diﬀerent (cf. Blonigen
and Wang (2004)). As an example, consider a study where we estimate the
standard gravity model for FDI flows from the Netherlands to the EU and EU
accession countries. We may be tempted to conclude that a significant number
of accession countries receive less FDI that can be expected. However, in a
study where we also include flows to other developing and emerging countries,
this conclusion may easily be reversed. In this study we broaden our sample as
much as possible, provided we have enough additional variables to correct for
possible remaining unobserved heterogeneity. Table 7 in the appendix contains
a list of all countries included in the present study.
2.2 Omitted variable bias
This brings us to a related problem: how do we correct for heterogeneity?
We started with the basic gravity model, with a proportionality variable Aij
including only population of the home and host country and a constant. In
order for the model to result in a good predictor for long-run FDI flows, we
want to minimize |FDˆIij − FDIij|. Put diﬀerently, we expand the vector Aij
so as to minimize the prediction error. We do so by taking a general-to-specific
approach in finding additional determinants of FDI with which we can extend
the model. In table 8 in the appendix, we given overview of all the variables
we considered, their expected sign and whether they were included in the
extended gravity equation discussed in this paper.
6 Psychic distance covers geographical, cultural, legal, religious, linguistic, histori-
cal, economic and ethnic aspects of the diﬀerences between two locations of business
activity. In practice, geographical distance is a proxy for psychic distance. See Meyer
(1998, pp.101) or Johansson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975).
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Another solution would be to specify group-specific constants Ak, to be used
as regional dummies (cf. Döhrn (1996)) that measure structural excesses or
shortages in FDI. To the extent that the heterogeneity in investment behavior
manifests itself within regions, these dummies may bias conclusions regarding
structural FDI received within the region. We focus on the performance of
individual transition countries and suggest three approaches. First, we test
the sensitivity of our results to diﬀerent specifications for Ak. Second, we
analyze the extent to which individual countries structurally receive over- or
underinvestment and/or if there are certain turning points in time. Finally,
we graphically demonstrate the country-specific pattern of actual investments
vis-à-vis predicted investments.
2.3 Nonlinearity
The last problem we deal with refers to nonlinearity. In the basic model we
have a relationship FDI = f (Aij, GDPi, GDPj, Distij), which we assume to
be linear in logs. But can we be certain that for each measure k, ∂ FDIijCkij is
strictly positive or negative? A certain control variable may not have the same
impact on countries that receive more FDI than expected and countries that
receive less than expected. This nonlinearity may hold especially for countries
that receive, proportionally, very high or low amounts of FDI. As an example,
think of oil-producing countries that receive a lot of investments. Given the
high degree of irreversibility of oil investments and the high stakes involved,
although an increase in political risk is expected lower investments, this may
not hold for these countries that receive a lot of investments. As Deardorﬀ
(1995) has convincingly shown, there is no straightforward theoretical under-
pinning for the gravity equation. This inherent identification problem leads us
to an approach that is highly data driven.
For any distribution of the residual εij from the standard gravity equation, we
can conclude that countries with positive values of εij receive more investment
and countries with negative values of εij receive less investment than expected
based on the standard gravity equation. Thus, it is possible to identify what
we define as FDI+ (over-investment) and FDI− (under-investment). And for
any distribution of εij, one can be certain that the higher (lower) its value for
a country i, the higher the probability that there is indeed FDI+ (FDI−). We
therefore create separate dummy variables for the 50 percent largest positive
(for FDI+) and negative (for FDI−) value of εij. 7 The interaction terms of
7 Specifically, we use the basic gravity model to identify the residuals. These residu-
als are divided in two strata, the positive residuals and the negative residuals. Since
we assuming the residuals have a normal distribution with mean zero, approximately
half of the residuals will be positive and half will be negative. Of the positive (neg-
ative) residuals we select the 50 percent highest (lowest) values as FDI+ (FDI−).
Again, assuming the normal distribution, the group of FDI+ will consist of roughly
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these dummy variables with the FDI determinants in the gravity model, allow
to identify A+, A− and A. For the model becomes:
lnFDIij =β0 + β1 lnGDPj + β2 lnPOPj − β3 lnDistij (5)
+
KP
k=1
β4,k lnCijk +
KP
k=1
β5,kD+ lnCijk +
KP
k=1
β6,kD− lnCijk + εij
whereD+ andD− are dummy variables for countries with FDI+ and countries
with FDI−, based on the standard gravity equation. This way, we can measure
the marginal eﬀect of a determinant k on over-investment respectively under-
investment and test whether this impact is significantly diﬀerent from what
we observe for the observations where investment is in line with what can be
expected, based on standard gravity model. 8
Summing up, we have introduced the gravity model used to study FDI flows
and identified three potential weaknesses that we deal with in this paper. In
the next section, we provide an overview of studies that have used a gravity
model to study investment in the accession countries, in order to find out to
what extent these studies may be biased by these weaknesses.
3 Literature
This section contains a brief overview of the literature that uses the gravity
model as the basic vehicle to study relative investment flows. We focus on
studies that have estimated this model for transition economies. Table one
presents an overview of studies that have adapted a (somewhat extended)
version of the standard gravity model to transition economies.
Döhrn (1996) focused specifically on EU enlargement and its role in channel-
ing investment flows from the EU to the CEEC. He includes a variable that
measures net trade flows and makes trade orthogonal on (factors that explain)
FDI in order to better capture possible substitution eﬀects between trade and
25 percent of all observations and the FDI− observations will be about 25 percent
of the total observations as well. However, if the distribution of the residuals is
deviating from the normal distribution, it is with this selection method possible to
have for instance 20 percent of the observations defined as FDI+ and 30 percent as
FDI−. The sum of the observations in the FDI+ and FDI− groups always equals
50 percent of the population.
8 The decision to define over-investment and under-investment at the 50 percent
level is arbitrary. In order to find out how sensitive the approach is to the choice of
50 percent as a cut-oﬀ point, the percent age over- and underinvestment has been set
at diﬀerent levels between 25 percent and 75 percent , in order to check whether the
model fit and marginal eﬀects change significantly. The regressions using 50 percent
as boundary gave the best fit, coeﬃcients did not change in signs or significance.
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FDI. To reduce bias from diﬀerences in starting levels of investment, Döhrn
estimates the model both with FDI flows and FDI stocks as dependent vari-
able. Although the results included in table 1 are for the flow estimations,
the results for stock estimation are qualitatively similar. The models are es-
timated using OECD data for 1990-1992. The coeﬃcient for GDP has the
expected, positive sign, distance has a negative sign. On the basis of these
estimations, Döhrn concludes that “the enlargement of the EU as well as the
transformation in Eastern Europe have significant consequences for interna-
tional FDI. The magnitude of the impact of the EU enlargement, however, is
far from being clear. This is due to the fact that the rather complex process
of ‘integration’ can be introduced into the regressions only by some dummy
variables” (p. 130).
Table 1: Overview of Comparable FDI Gravity Studies
Paper Characteris tic GDP POP DIST Period Obs. A dj. R -sq.
Bevan & E strin (2000 ) Leve l es tim a tion (model 1) + - n .a. 1994 -98 558 0 .35
Bevan & E strin (2000 ) First d iﬀ erences (model 2) + ins ig n .a. 1994 -98 n.a. 0 .0 5
Brenton et al. (1999) B ilateral g ravity + - - 1982 -95 304-514 0 .33-0.60
Brenton & D i-Mauro (1999) Extended gravity model + - - 1992 -95 122-159 0 .50-0.64
Buch et al. (2001) Substitution w ith trade + +/- - 1991 -97 +/-30 0 .40-0.60
Döhrn (1996) Trade orthogona l on other facto rs + n.a . - 1990 -92 310 0 .44-0.78
Garibald i et al. (2002) FD I and portfolio investm ent + + n.a. 1990 -99 145-179 0 .90-0.93
All signs rep orted for sign ificant co eﬃ c ients. In case a study contained severa l gravity es tim ations, the resu lts reflected by
the ma jo rity of those regressions a re inc luded in th is tab le.
Buch et al. (2001) also look at possible substitution eﬀects. They focus specif-
ically on substitution between diﬀerent regions, and estimate a basic model
using FDI from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
the U.K., U.S. and Japan to 48 host counties for 1991, 1993, 1995 and 1997. 9
Using out-of-sample tests, specifically for Germany, the authors find no evi-
dence of substitution of FDI flows from southern countries to the CEEC. They
conclude that the observed increase in FDI to the CEEC can be explained as
a stock adjustment.
The results of Bevan and Estrin (2000) are somewhat diﬃcult to compare
with Buch et al. (2001), since distance is missing in their analysis and since
there is no overlap with respect to the period estimated. Bevan and Estrin use
bilateral FDI flows from the EU-14 (Belgium and Luxembourg are merged),
Korea, Japan, Switzerland and the U.S. to the CEEC. They estimate a panel
of 151 bilateral FDI connections, for the period 1994-1998. Again, the coeﬃ-
cient for GDP carries a significant, positive sign. Population negatively and
significantly aﬀects the FDI stock. With an adjusted R2 (R-sq. adj.) of 0.35,
the fit is remarkably low. With the help of structural shift dummy variables
9 They also run a separate analysis for FDI flows from Germany to 37 countries,
for the period 1981-1997. Results for this analysis are not presented here, but are
very similar.
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for key announcements of progress in EU accession, the authors show that EU
accession has influenced FDI, but country credit ratings have no eﬀect. When
the analysis is performed using first diﬀerences (model two), results remain
qualitatively the same, but the fit worsens to 0.05.
Brenton et al. (1999) use a bilateral gravity model approach to assess the
impact of the deepening integration between the EU and the CEEC, in an at-
tempt to see whether an increase in the attractiveness of the CEEC to foreign
investors has aﬀected the magnitude of FDI going to other European coun-
tries. The authors add an adjacency variable and separate the two possible
eﬀects distance has on FDI (as mentioned above). The authors test what the
eﬀect is of concurrent trade and investment liberalization. Their methodol-
ogy diﬀers somewhat from the studies discussed so far. First, they estimate a
gravity model using FDI stocks, as well as a gravity model using exports and
imports. Next, they use the residual from the FDI regressions in the import
and export regressions in order to assess the impact of FDI on bilateral trade.
They let these residuals interact with dummies for diﬀerent groups of coun-
tries. Finally, they investigate “whether changes in FDI flows to particular
countries or regions, in response to an increase in economic integration, had a
noticeable impact upon the flows of FDI going to other, excluded, regions” (p.
119). They do so by graphically comparing the distribution of FDI flows over
time (specifically for Spain and Portugal). The analysis is performed for all EU
countries. Table 4.1 shows that the coeﬃcient for GDP carries the expected
positive sign. Population is negative, as is distance. Again, however, no sub-
stitution eﬀect between FDI and trade is found. For Spain and Portugal also
no evidence for substitution of FDI between the CEEC and other European
countries is found.
In Brenton and Di Mauro (1999), the main aim is to check whether inflows of
FDI from EU countries to CEEC are “disappointingly low” (p. 59). Both for
(net) exports and FDI, Brenton and Di Mauro first estimate an extended grav-
ity model, with dummy variables representing preferential relationships. Next,
they regress the residuals from the trade model on the residuals from the FDI
model, in order to find out whether there are substitution eﬀects. The analysis
is performed with pooled FDI and export data over the years 1992-1995, for
Germany, France, the U.K. and the U.S. and a panel of around 35 destina-
tion countries. The fit is reasonable (R-sq. adj. ranges between 0.50 (UK) and
0.64 (France)). The results are as expected, with a positive significant impact
for GDP. The distance variable is negative and significant, indicating that
countries further away receive less FDI inflow. Population is insignificant. The
authors conclude that “the amount of overseas investment by EU countries in
the more advanced transition economies [is] already greater than one would
expect given their current level of income” (p. 59). With respect to regional
preference, Brenton and Di Mauro find that EU countries receive about three
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times more FDI from their EU neighbors Germany, France and the UK than
can be expected based on the gravity model. The transition countries Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic receive more FDI than the gravity variables
predict as well, but Romania and Bulgaria receive a smaller share than ex-
pected based on their gravity variables. Contrary to some of the other studies
described so far, they find complementarities between exports and FDI.
Garibaldi et al. (2002) go one step further and distinguish between diﬀerent
types of capital flows. They estimate an extended gravity model for both
FDI and portfolio investment. Their study is - indirectly - motivated by the
fact that, unlike FDI, portfolio investment does not involve large sunk costs.
As a result, the portfolio investments can be withdrawn rather quickly in
adverse conditions. This possibility to withdraw the money puts the transition
economies at a risk, especially in times when they desperately need foreign
capital. Garibaldi et al. (2002) try to find diﬀerences between the behavior
of both types of capital. They use data for the CEEC and the former Soviet
Union for the period 1990-1999. Their gravity variables carry the expected
sign and indicate a diverse pattern for overall capital flows. However, FDI is
found to be a “relatively stable source of financing in most countries during
the early transition years and continued to play an important role in most [. . . ]
countries at least until 1998” (p. 30). In contrast to FDI, “portfolio investment
is very poorly explained by fundamentals” (p. 30).
Summing up, the results of empirical research using the gravity model indicate
that a higher GDP in a host country leads to higher FDI inflows. However,
contradicting the expectations, a larger population does not always lead to
a larger FDI inflow. Smaller countries receive relatively more investments.
Distance between the host and home country limits FDI flows. In general,
studies cited so far conclude that Central and Eastern European countries
receive what can be expected on the basis of the simple gravity model.
4 Data
The database we use for this research includes yearly data for 207 countries
for the period of 1987 to 2001 (see table 7 in the appendix). FDI flows are
aggregated investment data from the Netherlands Central Bank (DNB). GDP
and population data are taken from the World Development Indicators 2001
(WDI). Distance in kilometers (km) is calculated based on the geographic
coordinates of the country capitals. 10 Quarterly flow data are accumulated to
yearly flow data and converted from Dutch Guilders to USD using the average
yearly exchange rate. In the literature, there are two approaches for dealing
with negative and zero values of FDI flows and GDP. Either all negative or
10 The dataset contained 441 observations with missing values of GDP or distances.
Those observations were dropped from the analysis.
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zero values of FDI and GDP are deleted from the analysis, or they are replaced
by a very small positive number. In our database, we can distinguish between
missing data and a flow of zero. Missing data are indeed missing in the original
dataset and a flow of zero in the dataset means a flow between 0 and 1.000.000
euro. We drop missing observation from the dataset and replace zero FDI flows
with an average value of 500.000 euro. In addition, we drop negative values
from the analysis instead of including them as a small positive value. 11 The
total number of observations deleted from the database is 405 on a total of
3,495 observations. 12
Table 2: Economic and Geographic Classification of Transition Countries
Econom ic d iv ision
European acces sion countries Res t of CEE Central Asia
G eog raphic C entral Bu lgaria (nego tia ting) Alban ia
d iv is ion and Eastern C zech Repub lic Bosn ia-Herzegovina
Europ e (CEE) E ston ia Croatia
Hunga ry Macedon ia
Latvia Yugoslavia.
L ithuan ia
Poland
Romania (nego tia ting)
S lovak Republic
S loven ia
Form er Arm enia Kazakhstan
Soviet Azerbaijan Kyrgyzstan
Union Bela rus , Ta jik istan
Georgia Turkm enistan
Moldova Uzb ekistan
Russia
Ukraine
With respect to regional classifications, several dummy variables are created
to capture the transition eﬀect suﬃciently. The variable "Western Europe"
consists of all countries and city-states geographically located in Western Eu-
rope that are not transition economies. 13 The variable “transition countries”
11 Negative values mean the sum of firms in a country divested in that country in
a specific year. Divesting can occur through closing or scaling down of FDI values,
but also through repayment of loans undertaken in the home country. Therefore,
we have to weigh the sample bias that may result from dropping these observations
against the measurement bias from a non-neutral logarithmic transformation. Given
the large number of country-year observations already in our database, we decide
in favor of the former and drop negative values.
12 Replacing all negative values with a small positive value of FDI instead of deleting
them, does not change the results of the gravity regression significantly except for
generating a lower fit (R-sq. adj. of 0.42), but does lead to a complete group of
outliers in the error analysis in section four.
13 Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Channel Islands, Denmark, Faeroe Islands, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxem-
12
takes the value one for all countries located in Central and Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union, undergoing the transition from a planned economy
to a market economy. These transition countries are subdivided in categories
marked by dummy variables, in order to take their geographic position and
economic development into account. Geographically, the transition countries
are divided in Central and Eastern European countries and former Soviet
Union countries. Economically, there is a clear division between those coun-
tries entering the EU or negotiating EU accession which are economically most
developed, the rest of Central and Eastern Europe and the countries of Central
Asia. Table 2 shows this classification of countries.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Western Europe EU Accession CEE rest I
a
CEEC rest I I
b
Russia C entral Asia
N o. of countries 25 10 12 11 1 5
Popu lation (m ln) 20,5 10,4 20,7 9 ,5 144 ,8 11,3
GDP (m ln . USD) 437891,0 401157,3 34625,7 9596,1 309951,2 8440,2
GDP p er cap ita 23677,9 4267 ,0 1348,2 1276,2 2140,4 706 ,7
FD I (m ln . USD) 437,8 24,1 27,2 1 ,21 312 ,6 0,7
FD I p er capita 149,8 1,36 0,33 0 ,17 2,11 0,04
D istance (km ) 1023 1268 2036 2025 2157 4848
a
= inc luding Russia ;
b
= exclud ing Russia. A ll numb ers in USD , un less noted otherw ise. Sources: 1) Popu lation , GDP
and GDP per cap ita from WDI 2001 (for Western Europ e n=19 ), 2)FD I from De N ederlandsche Bank database 2001,
C entra l Asia for 2000, 3) D istance between Amsterdam and host country cap ital in km , as the crow fl ie s (own calculations
(Internet distance calcu lator))
We extend the database with macroeconomic and social indicators from the
WDI database and financial variables from the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics (IFS) database. Given the scope of the WDI and IFS databases for
the period 1987-2001, we select 60 variables. These variables are classified in
sub-groups and a summary is included in table 8 in the appendix. In addi-
tion, we select three diﬀerent risk indicators from the Euromoney database,
reflecting country risk, political risk and economic risk. 14 Summary statistics
for the main gravity variables for the main regions are included in table 3.
bourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom.
14 Euromoney provides a score twice a year, ranging from 0 to 100 with 0 being a
very high risk and 100 being a very low risk. We use yearly averages for the years
after 1993, when two scores were available per year. For the years before 1993, we
use the available score as a yearly average. Political risk scores are only available
from 1992 onwards. The economic risk variable is available starting 1986, but 1988
and 1989 are missing. These values are substituted by the average of the 1987 and
1990 score. Country risk scores are available for all years.
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5 Results
Dutch yearly FDI flows are volatile and there is no clear time trend. 15 In order
to explain the size of the flows, we start with a basic gravity model, that we
extend with regional dummies to capture the long run equilibrium level. The
first analysis includes the basic gravity model variables. In line with the liter-
ature, FDI flows are higher if the GDP of the host country is higher, the host
country population is larger and the distance to the host country is smaller.
In table four column one the results are displayed. The joint coeﬃcients of
the basic model are significant and the explanatory power is remarkably high,
given the fact that only the three basic variables are used (R-sq. adj. of 0.52).
GDP and Distance are significant at a one percent level, population is in-
significant. 16 In dealing with the three methodological problems described in
section 5, we discuss the sample bias by extending the basic gravity model
with regional dummy variables (section 5.1), include additional variables to
deal with an omitted variable problem (section 5.2) and add interaction terms
to investigate nonlinearity (section 5.3).
5.1 Sample bias
In the literature, a typical way to see whether countries in the transition
countries indeed receive FDI flows based on their gravity values involves adding
regional dummies to the gravity equation. As mentioned in section 2, we try
to avoid the sample bias present in many gravity studies by analyzing FDI
flows from the Netherlands to a very large sample of countries.
As a first step in finding out whether transition countries receive the share of
FDI they deserve based on our basic gravity prediction, we use the regional
dummies as defined in table 3, namely Western Europe, the EU accession
countries, the rest of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. If the
coeﬃcient for a dummy variable is significantly positive, a country receives
more than the expected FDI inflow. If it is negative, countries in that specific
region receive less Dutch FDI than expected based on their GDP, population
size and distance from the Netherlands. If the coeﬃcient is insignificant, there
is no substantial evidence that a region receive proportionally more or less
FDI than other countries in the world.
For the regressions including regional dummies, GDP and Population have the
15We estimated the basic gravity model with a time trend and found it to be
insignificant. In fact, correlation between FDI and the time trend is also low and
insignificant.
16When clustering the results over countries in order to take into account that FDI
flows to a certain country may not vary too much per year, we find no changes in
the result.
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expected positive, significant sign. The Distance eﬀect is significantly negative:
countries further away from the Netherlands, ceteris paribus, receive less FDI.
The inclusion of the regional dummies indicate the performance of that region
compared to general FDI flows to the world. The Western Europe dummy is
highly positive and significant. It indicates that Dutch FDI in the EU was sig-
nificantly higher than expected based on the gravity variables of the Western
European countries. In fact, the flows were six percent higher compared to
Dutch investment behavior in the rest of the world. This dummy thus com-
pensates for the negative distance eﬀect within the EU, being a member of
the EU is more important than being at a short distance.
The coeﬃcient for the EU accession countries is insignificant, indicating that
those counties receive the expected amount of FDI. At least when it comes to
foreign investments, these transition countries no longer seem to experience
any negative eﬀects. However, they also do not have the positive regional eﬀect
from being a future EU member, since the coeﬃcient is still not significantly
diﬀerent from zero. 17
The other two transition regions, the rest of Central and Eastern Europe
and Central Asia, do not have a positive regional eﬀect, as is reflected by
the negative significant coeﬃcients for the regional dummy. This negative
eﬀect is highest for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe that are not
negotiating EU accession yet. They receive only about 20 percent of the Dutch
investment inflow that is expected based on their GDP, population size and
distance. 18
In specifications (3) and (4) in table 4, we include a time trend, starting in
1988. This trend variable is included to measure whether there is a catch-up
eﬀect of FDI flows from their low levels in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
However, the variable time is insignificant. 19
17 Bulgaria and Romania are included with the EU accession countries in this analy-
sis, even though they do not enter the EU in 2004. However, including these coun-
tries in the CEECRest group does not lead to significant changes. The EUaccession
coeﬃcient becomes higher, but remains insignificant and the CEECRest coeﬃcient
becomes less negative and remains significant.
18 The regional coeﬃcients do not display diﬀerent signs or significance when in-
cluded as single dummy or jointly.
19 In order to double check whether this transition eﬀect does exist, we also per-
formed a yearly analysis. Estimating the gravity model with regional dummies for
each year separately does not alter our results qualitatively. As is the case with the
time trend, there is no change in the size of the regional dummies to indicate that
there is a clear transition eﬀect. The yearly regressions for EU accession countries
are always insignificant. The rest of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
show consistent negative coeﬃcients, with Central Asian coeﬃcients always insignif-
icant. The coeﬃcient for the rest of Central and Eastern Europe is significant, but
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However, the large impact of the regional dummy variable may have macro-
economic, social or cultural explanations. We therefore return to this issue in
section 5.2, where we add several additional variables in order to see whether
the large regional impact is indeed explainable by additional variables (omit-
ted variables problem). In additional, there may simply be no regional eﬀect.
For example, the positive eﬀect the EU accession dummy may be the result of
high FDI flows to the top-three transition countries Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic, while the remaining countries in the region attract less FDI.
Table 4: Basic Model with Regional Disparities
Specifi cation (1) Ba sic (2 ) A ll (3) Basic incl. tim e (4) A ll inc l. Tim e (5) N ew regional d iv ision
LnGDP 0 .268 0 .215 0.268 0.215 0.242
(33.67) (23.79) (33.70) (23.82 ) (29 .88)
LnPop 0.04 0 .141 0.04 0.141 0.082
-1.85 (6.18) -1.83 (6.17 ) (3 .7 7)
Lnd ist -0.37 -0.18 -0.369 -0.179 -0.562
(8.46) (2.43) (8.46) (2.41 ) (11 .48)
Tim e 0.013 0.011
-1.57 -1.38
Weurop e 1 .507 1.511
(6.98) (7.00 )
EU1 0.692
(2 .74)
EU2 -1.329
(6 .18)
Euaccess 0 .1 44 0.145
-0.72 -0.73
CEECRest -1 .1 58 -1.151 -1.761
(6.64) (6.60 ) (10 .58)
CenAsia -0 .9 74 -0.966
(4.19) (4.16 )
CenAsia1 -1.206
(5 .46)
Kazakh -0 .21
-0 .3 7
Constant 1 .293 0 .053 1.196 -0.042 3.294
(3.22) -0.08 (2.95) -0.06 (7 .17)
Obs. 2301 2301 2301 2301 2296
R -sq. adj. 0.52 0.56 0.52 0.56 0 .56
Absolute value of t s tatistics in pa rentheses
As the basic gravity model already shows, the amounts of FDI to transition
economies vary substantially within the region since the signs and sizes of
regional dummy coeﬃcients show large deviations for the EU accession coun-
tries, the rest of the CEEC and Central Asia. Parts of these regional eﬀects are
the result of heavy influence of only a subset of countries, causing an upward or
downward bias in the regional average. There can be a misspecification of the
dummy variables for the regions, which leads to incorrect conclusions based
on those dummies. 20 Studying the average residuals from the basic gravity
only in half of the years.
20When including all transition countries as separate dummy variables, the results
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model for all the years from the transition countries gives similar results. Only
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Kazakhstan have
positive residuals, all other countries have negative residuals. These five coun-
tries thus positively influence the regional dummy coeﬃcient, possibly causing
the EU accession dummy to be insignificant and reducing the negative signif-
icance of the Central Asia dummy. In table 4, specification (5) we therefore
include a variation of the basic gravity model using new regional dummy
variable definitions. We divide the EU accession countries in an EU1 group
consisting of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic
and an EU2 group with the remaining six countries. The dummy for the rest
of the CEEC remains unchanged. Kazakhstan is excluded from the Central
Asia group and included as a separate dummy. The results show that for both
the EU accession countries and the Central Asian countries the coeﬃcients
change significantly. The ten EU accession countries combined had an insignif-
icant coeﬃcient, whereas divided in two regions, the four most advanced EU
accession countries (EU1) receive significantly more FDI than predicted by
the gravity variables, whereas the six remaining countries (EU2) receive sig-
nificantly less. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan receives an inflow of FDI as can
be expected, since its coeﬃcient is insignificant, but the other Central Asian
countries (CenAsia1) now have a larger negative significant coeﬃcient. 21 This
example indicates that signs and significance of dummy coeﬃcients should be
interpreted with care.
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Actual (log of ) FDI in b la ck co lumns, predicted (lo g of ) FD I in white columns (based on bas ic gravity model)
show that the Czech Republic and Hungary receive significantly more FDI than can
be expected on the basis of their gravity equation and Poland is the only country
with a positive insignificant coeﬃcient. All other countries have a significantly neg-
ative coeﬃcient, except for Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Romania
and the Slovak Republic, that have negative but insignificant coeﬃcients (these and
other results that are mentioned but not shown are available upon request from the
authors).
21We also excluded Russia from the CEECRest group and included it as a seperate
dummy variable. This does not change the results, both the CEECRest dummy and
Russia dummy have a negative significant sign.
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The basic gravity model only provides a long run equilibrium level and short
run volatility is not taken into account. For countries reforming so drastically
and only recently allowing FDI, a structural prediction model is not so valuable
given that these short run developments are major determinants of FDI and
largely overlooked by the basic gravity model. Still some interesting country
specific findings are detected. Above, we show two examples of country specific
performance and visualize the actual and predicted FDI for Hungary and
Romania. As expected, the predicted FDI flows (in black) are stable, whereas
actual FDI flows (in white) show more dispersion over the years.
The example of Hungary is selected since it was one of the two countries
(jointly with the Czech Republic) that had a significant positive dummy coef-
ficient when included as separate country dummy. This is an indication that
actual FDI flows to Hungary consistently exceed predicted flows. Romania on
the other hand shows, like most transition countries, a very volatile inflow of
FDI.
Both Hungary and Romania were among the first countries to allow joint
ventures including foreign participation in the early 1970s. Still, due to a
very unstable political and economic climate the inflows were very limited
in the 1970s and 1980s. But Hungary developed a more steady investment
policy, among others allowing for 100 percent foreign investments since 1988
and the presence of these laws gave the country a head start when transition
started. This legal advantage helps explain the large inflows in the early years
of transition. 22 Romania did not benefit from its beneficial legal structure,
mainly because of the disadvantages of the Ceauscescu regime.
Some of the FDI inflows can be directly linked to the countries respective
transition policies. In 1989, the year that the transition process started, the
inflows of FDI in both countries were negative. Also, economic and political
reforms influence FDI inflows. For example, Romania received a lot of FDI
in 1995 and 1996, when they implemented their economic recovery program,
but the inflow declined as quickly in the next years when the country en-
tered a recession. The method of privatization is also important. Hungary’s
main form of privatization of former state owned enterprises were the direct
sales, also to foreigners, encouraging FDI inflows already in the early years of
transition. Romania used management-employee buy-outs as main format of
privatization, a method not designed to attract FDI.
22 Until 1989, Hungary had adjusted its joint venture law frequently to adjust it to
the wishes of foreign investors (see for instance Djarova, 2004).
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5.2 Omitted variable bias
52 percent of FDI inflows are explained by basic gravity variables, giving the
long run perspective. There still is a huge volatility in FDI that is not taken
into account in this model. It thus remains interesting to see which additional
variables can be influential in explaining the short run volatility in FDI flows.
By doing so, we deal with possible omitted variable bias. First, we add a geo-
graphic continent variable. As can be seen in table 5, the resulting coeﬃcients
are significantly diﬀerent from zero. This confirms the validity of our research
question: is it really geography that explains FDI flows and magnitudes, or
are there diﬀerent underlying reasons? To increase the understanding of the
magnitude of Dutch FDI flows, specifications (2) to (8) include infrastruc-
ture and lagged FDI and variables in the categories religion, macroeconomic,
sector, balance of payments and risk indicators. 23 A description of all vari-
ables, the abbreviation used, how they are included and the sources, as well
as the followed selection procedure of the variables is included in table 7 in
the appendix.
Table 5: Gravity Model with Additional Variables
Specifi cation (1) Continent (2) Religion (3) In fra (4) Macro (5) Sector (6) BoP (7) R isk (8) FD I[t-1]
GDP 0.162 0.233 0.238 GDP 0.256 0.242 0.087 0.095 0 .13
(16 .85) (27 .56) (28.46) (30 .69) (28 .31) (4.20 ) (7.72) (15 .16 )
Popu lation 0.214 0.167 0.1 Popu lation 0.029 0.092 -0.064 0.335 0.004
(8 .73) (7 .2 4) (4.45) -0.4 (3 .7 7) -1.08 (10.27) -0 .22
D istance -0.696 -0.443 -0.294 Distance -0.426 -0.407 -0.405 -0.165 -0.173
(8 .07) (9 .8 8) (6.42) (9 .2 0) (8 .9 5) (5.09 ) (3.06) (4 .45 )
Africa -1.5089 Exchange rate -0.026
(7 .04) (5 .3 9)
Asia -1.821 Labor Force 0.045
(6 .71) -0 .6 2
Cen . America -0.709 Agriculture -0.065
(2 .82) (5 .6 1)
EU accession -1.657 Industry 0.097
(8 .45) (2 .7 1)
CEECRest -2.766 Services 0.145
(13 .47) (3 .4 5)
Central A sia -2.184 Goods Exp ort -0.799
(7 .34) (3.37 )
M idd le Ea st -1.276 Goods Imp ort 0.88
(5 .91) (2.57 )
Resto fWorld -0.541 Services Exp . -0.231
-1.9 -1.36
South America 0 .39 Services Imp. 0.117
-1.4 -0.46
North America 1.705 Incom e Exp. 0
(5 .54) 0
SE A sia 0.265 Incom e Imp. 0.793
Continued on next page...
23 Infrastructure is constructed by dividing the landarea in km2 bij the number of
km highway in a country.
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... table 5 continued
Specifi cation (1) Continent (2) Religion (3) In fra (4) Macro (5) Sector (6) BoP (7) R isk (8) FD I[t-1]
-0 .9 4 (6.64 )
Muslim -1.248 Trade Exp. -0.054
(11 .98) -0.66
Orthodox -1 .51 Trade Imp. -0.051
(9 .32) -0.67
Buddhism -1.384 Capital E xp . 0.106
(7 .95) (2.64 )
M ixture -0.549 Capital Imp. -0.068
(5 .76) -1 .5
Other -1.135 Country risk 0.019
(5 .55) (2.77)
In frastructure -1.157 Politica l risk 0.119
(9.79) (4.97)
Econom ic risk 0.005
-1.04
Lagged FD I 0 .55
(29 .78 )
Constant 5.945 2 .69 -2.941 Constant 1.775 -2.149 -5.526 -1.424 0.535
(9 .65) (6 .3 4) (5.47) -1 .7 1 -1 .7 2 (3.47 ) (2.80) -1 .52
Obs. 2301 2301 2241 Obs. 2100 2010 599 1303 1902
Adj. R -sq. 0 .6 2 0 .56 0.55 Adj. R -sq. 0 .5 3 0 .52 0.69 0.62 0 .69
Absolute value of t statistics in pa rentheses . A ll va riables included as log s except for dummy variab les
All specifications have an equal or better fit than the basic gravity model and
the joint variables remain significant. In addition, several of the added vari-
ables are significant. As expected, the geographical dummies included in spec-
ification (1) add a lot of explanatory power to the model. With the Western
European countries as baseline category, assuming the Netherlands is trading
most with other EU countries, all other continents coeﬃcients are expected
to have a negative sign. Contrary to expectations, countries located in North
America attract significantly more FDI than the countries in Western Eu-
rope. With the exception of South America, South East Asia and the rest
of the world, all other continents receive significantly less FDI than Western
European countries.
Including religion (specification (2)) gives the expected results. Countries with
a similar religion as the Netherlands (Christianity) attract significantly more
FDI than countries with a predominant, diﬀerent religion. There is no real
diﬀerence in the size of the coeﬃcients for the three major religions (Muslim,
Orthodox and Buddhism).
Countries with a better-developed infrastructure, measured in land area di-
vided by kilometers of highways, attract significantly more FDI than countries
with a less developed roadnet (specification (3)). As countries become more
developed in terms of infrastructure provisions, population size becomes less
important since it becomes more convenient and less costly to do business
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also in smaller countries. 24 In addition, having a large country area with a
relatively small population size is not negative as long as the infrastructure is
developed well.
Interpreting specification (4), including macroeconomic variables, is more dif-
ficult. The exchange rate negatively influences FDI inflows and population be-
comes insignificant, though the link between those two eﬀects is unclear. Agri-
cultural countries attract less FDI than industrial or service oriented countries
(specification (5)). 25 The export of goods negatively influences FDI inflows
and the imports are positively significant. Thus, as exports from the Nether-
lands to a host country increase (imports for the host county), FDI flows also
increase and thus trade and FDI are complementary. The income flows in the
country also positively increase FDI. This relationship seems logical, given
that FDI in essence is income to the host country. As expected, less risky
countries receive significantly more FDI, with political risk being the most
important risk factor. 26 The (one-year) lagged FDI also positively influences
this year’s inflow. In this model (specification (8)), population becomes in-
significant, indicating lagged FDI includes a size eﬀect of FDI flows making
country size unnecessary. 27
5.3 Nonlinearity
Up to this point, we assume a log-linear relationship of all variables with FDI.
We now investigate whether relaxing that assumption changes our analysis of
FDI in the CEEC. We do so by creating interaction eﬀects, therewith dividing
our observations in three strata, that each can aﬀect FDI diﬀerently.
In order to see if there are variables that specifically explain FDI in countries
that receive proportionally a lot of (respectively very little) investments, we
created two dummy variables called FDI+ and FDI− (see section 2.3). From
the countries with positive residuals in the basic gravity model, the obser-
vations within the upper half of the distribution have been marked as FDI+
24When the variable landarea in km2 and highways (measured in km) are included
seperately, they both have a positive significant impact on FDI.
25 This is in line with the country development path, that less developed countries
often specialize more in less R&D intensive products such as agriculture and more
developed countries specialize in industry and services. More developed countries
(high GDP per capita) also receive more FDI inflows. (lnFDI = -1.99 + 0.33lnGDP
per capita, with GDP per capita significant at 1 percent and the R-sq. adj. = 0.44).
26 Also when taken separately, political risk has a significant positive coeﬃcient of
0.19 and country and economic risk of 0.04.
27 A variable including lagged GDP has been included as well. However, the value
added of this variable was minimal. Though positive and significant, the coeﬃcient
oﬀ GDP was decreasing with exactly the size of the lagged GDP coeﬃcient. Thus
GDP and lagged GDP were substitutes.
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observations and the observations in the lowest 50 percent of the negative
residual group are marked as FDI− observations. Interaction variables are cre-
ated by multiplying these dummy variables with the added variables, in order
to see if some variables display diﬀerent eﬀects for countries receiving more
FDI than can be expected, average receivers and countries that are receiving
less FDI than can be expected. For example, a country at war will most likely
receive low inflows of FDI. In addition, we expect the political stability of such
a country to be lower than of countries not at war. As such, we expect the
interaction variable created by multiplying the FDI− dummy and the political
risk indicator to be large negative and significant, whereas we expect the co-
eﬃcient to be less large for the overinvesting countries. Table seven shows the
results of the eight gravity models used in table six, with the addition of FDI+
and FDI− interaction terms for all variables except the basic gravity variables.
The analysis shows that for all models the fit increases significantly, with an
R-sq. adj. between 0.77 and 0.94. In all models the FDI− and FDI+ interac-
tion terms are highly significant and they carry opposite signs, whereas the
coeﬃcient and significance of the original variable diminishes. When we look
at the impact of the FDI+ and FDI− variables for the diﬀerent specifications,
we notice several interesting things. Originally, the signs for the continent co-
eﬃcients South America and South East Asia were positive. Now, they have
become negative. However, the coeﬃcients for the overinvesting interaction
term are high and significant at one percent level.
These countries influence the general coeﬃcient probably to such a large extent
that the coeﬃcient became positive, whereas this positive eﬀect now is taken
into account in the interaction term. Thus, without the interaction term the
conclusion of the gravity model is that these regions receive more FDI than
can be expected based on their basic gravity performance. With the inclusion
of the interaction term, for South America the conclusion has to be that in
general this continent receives FDI according to the gravity predictions, but
there are some countries within this continent that receive significantly more
and some countries that receive significantly less. For South East Asia the shift
is even more visible, since instead of having a positive significant coeﬃcient,
it now has a negative significant coeﬃcient. Thus, on average countries in
this region receive significantly less than expected, with an additional eﬀect
for the least receiving countries, but there also some countries that receive
significantly more than predicted. This result is an indication that in those
regions there are some countries that are attracting large inflows of FDI and
are included in the “FDI+” category. Again, this highlights the importance of
the bias resulting from composing regional dummy variables.
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The results of specification (3) including sector-specific variables are interest-
ing. Being an agricultural country clearly acts as a negative for attracting
Dutch FDI, whereas industry has no eﬀect and services show small positive
eﬀects. The Balance of Payment specification confirms these results. Imports
and exports of goods are insignificant and the service inflows and outflows of a
host country as well, except for the underreceiving host countries. Thus in gen-
eral, countries imports and exports of goods and services have no clear eﬀect
on FDI inflows. This conclusion contradicts the results of table 5, where FDI
and exports from the Netherlands to the host countries were complementary.
With respect to the specification including the risk indicators, it is hard to
draw sensible conclusions, also because they show high correlation (0.9) and
are all significant. Lower country risk (as reflected by a higher score) clearly
influences FDI positively, but the political score seems to have the reverse
impact. A high political risk increases Dutch FDI. The impact of lagged FDI
shows the expected significant results, but does not lead to much better fit with
inclusion of the interaction terms. Both adding variables to the gravity model
in order to explain short-term volatility in FDI flows, as well as the definition
of the regional dummy variables influence the gravity results significantly. A
more elaborate analysis of the countries that receive a lot more that can be
expected (FDI+) or less than expected (FDI−) can help understand FDI flows
to transition countries. Because the groups of countries that receive a lot more
(less) than can be expected are defined each year, trends in the inclusion of
countries from the diﬀerent regions in the FDI+ group and FDI− group can be
expected as well. For example, Western European countries receive on average
relatively more FDI and are expected to be more included in the OverFDI
group and less in the FDI− group than for instance Central Asian countries.
We broadly studied the division of transition countries in the OverFDI and
FDI− group and found as expected that the whole region is still more included
in the FDI− strata than in the FDI+ strata. However, again the general ge-
ographic pattern is clear, while about 65 percent of the CEEC and Central
Asian observations are included in the FDI− group, this is only 39 percent for
the EU accession observations. On the other hand, only 25 percent of the EU
accession observations are included in the FDI+ group. This is in line with the
conclusion based on the regional dummy variables; a large percentage inclu-
sion in the FDI+ group would have indicated a catch up eﬀect even though
the dummy coeﬃcient indicates that no catch-up takes place.
6 Conclusion
This paper focuses on aggregate Dutch FDI flows, specifically explaining FDI
inflows to Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The gravity model
is taken as the basic tool for the analysis. The methodology followed and
data used add to the existing literature in three fields. There are substantial
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theoretical advantages, new and interesting empirical results and practical im-
plications. Theoretically, the approach adds to the existing research in several
ways. First, much can be learned from the basic gravity model when it is in-
terpreted as a long run equilibrium model. The basic gravity variables explain
FDI flows to a large extent and its explanatory power merits its inclusion in a
study of this kind. However, the basic model fails to incorporate volatility of
FDI flows. Thus, the unexplained variance of the basic model should be treated
with care and studying this unexplained variance increases the insight into the
nature and pattern of investment flows. Second, a rich and elaborate dataset
can enrich the results obtained from a gravity model. Most importantly, we
can avoid erroneous conclusions based on omitted countries or regions (as op-
posed to omitted variables). Catch-up eﬀects of certain countries or regions can
only be detected if there is a representative number of countries included to
measure the general trend of FDI flows. Similarly, substitution between coun-
tries can only be proven if the pool of countries in addition to the countries
studied is large enough. Finally, having a large database eliminates the chance
of having a sample bias. Most gravity studies use a database including data
from developed (OECD) countries as basis, since those data are most easily
accessible and add data on the region studied. However, selecting countries on
availability of the data most often means excluding those countries, which are
relatively less developed and receive lower FDI inflows. As a result, the FDI
flows will be upward biased and results derived from those data will be incor-
rect. By including 207 countries, the whole world, in this database and using
all of the countries information to estimate the gravity model, this problem is
avoided in this chapter. Third, as mentioned already, the basic gravity model
is a simple linear regression, including only three explanatory variables. Be-
sides omitting variables, also assuming linearity can be a theoretical drawback
of the model. In an attempt to deal with the problem of omitted variables,
60 additional indicators have been added to the basic gravity equation. The
study also allows for non-linearity, by creating dummy variables for countries
receiving far more (less) FDI than can be expected based on the basic gravity
modeland using those dummy variables to add interaction eﬀects. Our results
show that certain explanatory variables indeed have a relationship with FDI
flows that is of a non-linear nature.
Empirically, the focus of this paper was to explain the size and pattern of
Dutch FDI flows to transition countries. Our first result is that there is no
evidence of an overall catch-up eﬀect of the region. In general, the expecta-
tions are that transition countries, after having been closed for FDI for a long
period, should be catching up and receiving relatively large FDI inflows. How-
ever, the more we control for the heterogeneity of the transition countries in
the data set (through the inclusion of the basic gravity variables, additional
variables and interaction eﬀects), the larger the evidence that there is no such
a thing as an overall upward gravity pull for these countries. There is also no
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reason to assume the flows of Dutch FDI to the EU accession countries will
increase in the near future, once these eight countries join the EU. Currently,
those countries have already reached their long run equilibrium level. The rest
of the transition countries still receive FDI inflows below their long run equi-
librium level, but those countries are not aﬀected by EU accession. Thus, also
for those countries it is not realistic to expect a more than average increase in
FDI inflows in the near future. A careful conclusion that follows also from the
literature overview is that past evidence in favor of such an eﬀect is the result
of measurement bias. Second, there is no reason to believe in a substitution
between regions or countries purely on geographical grounds. Apparently, the
nature of investments is such that the relative amount of FDI a country re-
ceives is mostly dependent on its own characteristics and far less on the region
in which it is situated. The fact that Hungary and the Czech Republic receive
large inflows of FDI is not due to the fact that they are situated in Central
Europe. For instance the Slovak Republic, also situated in this region, is per-
forming less in attracting FDI. Equally, the fact that the Slovak Republic is
not receiving such large inflows is not caused by good results in the Czech Re-
public and Hungary absorbing flows that would otherwise go to Slovakia, but
purely by reasons inherent to Slovakia’s own country characteristics. Third,
in line with what has been found elsewhere, we find some (weak) evidence of
a complementary relation between FDI and trade. Thus, there is no support
for the argument that firms first explore the market by exporting and engage
in an FDI later. More likely, companies follow their customer. Dutch firms are
exporting goods and services to Dutch companies abroad (increasing the im-
port of the host country) and Dutch companies abroad transport or sell their
goods again in the Netherlands (increasing the export of the host country).
These results have some practical implications for transition economies and
businesses making investment decisions. The main lesson learnt for transition
economies trying to attract FDI is that getting the basic fundamentals (price
stability, growth) right is the main trigger for FDI. Given that there is no
evidence of substitution of FDI between countries, a country will not attract
FDI that would have otherwise gone to neighboring countries. In addition there
is no specific regional eﬀect. There is a large deviation in country performance
within each region, thus the fact that a country is located in a good performing
region does not necessarily mean the country is doing well in attracting FDI.
Besides size, distance and economic performance, factors like historical ties,
religion, accessibility and country risks influence FDI flows. For example, a
stable political environment, reliable institutions and infrastructure all help
increase the FDI flows. Free trade is another important factor in increasing
FDI, given that trade and FDI are complementary. Opening up trade increases
FDI flows and a higher FDI stock in a country again leads to higher trade.
When we observe the transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe,
we note that not all countries in the EU accession region are doing equally
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well in attracting FDI flows. FDI does not follow a stable time pattern, and
volatility in flows over the years is high. When we look at individual countries,
the Czech Republic and Hungary and to a lesser extent Poland are the star
performers in the region when it comes to attracting FDI. A second tier group
consists of Romania and the Slovak Republic. There is no evidence that those
countries can account for large catch up eﬀects once joining the EU in 2004.
The FDI flows to other countries in the region are instable, perhaps reflecting
the situation in these countries.
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Appendix
Table 7: Countries Included in the Analysis
1 Afghan istan 53 Djibouti 1 05 Latvia 157 Russian Federation
2 Albania 54 Dom in ica 106 Lebanon 158 Rwanda
3 Algeria 55 Dom in ican Repub lic 107 Lesotho 159 Samoa
4 American Samoa 56 Ecuador 108 L iberia 160 San M arino
5 Andorra 57 Egypt, A rab Rep. 109 L ibya 161 Sao Tome and P rinc ipe
6 Angola 58 El Salvado r 110 L iechtenstein 162 Saud i Arabia
7 Antigua and Barbuda 59 Equatorial G uinea 111 L ithuan ia 163 Senega l
8 Argentina 60 Eritrea 112 Luxembourg 164 Seyche lles
9 Arm enia 61 Eston ia 113 Macao , China 165 S ierra Leone
10 Aruba 62 Eth iop ia 114 Macedon ia, FYR 166 S ingap ore
11 Australia 63 Faero e Islands 115 Madagascar 167 S lovak Republic
12 Austria 64 Fiji 1 16 Ma law i 168 S loven ia
13 Azerbaijan 65 Fin land 117 Ma laysia 169 Solomon Islands
14 Bahamas, The 66 France 118 Ma ld ives 170 Somalia
15 Bahrain 67 French Polynesia 119 Ma li 1 71 South A frica
16 Bangladesh 68 Gab on 120 Ma lta 172 Spain
17 Barbados 69 Gambia, The 121 Marshall Islands 173 Sri Lanka
18 Belarus 70 Georgia 122 Mauritan ia 174 St. K itts and Nevis
19 Belgium 71 Germany 123 Mauritius 175 St. Lucia
20 Belize 72 Ghana 124 Mayotte 176 St. V incent/Grenadines
21 Ben in 73 Greece 125 Mexico 177 Sudan
22 Bermuda 74 Green land 126 M icrones ia , Fed . Sts. 1 78 Surinam e
23 Bhutan 75 Grenada 127 Mo ldova 179 Swaziland
24 Boliv ia 76 Guam 128 Monaco 180 Sweden
25 Bosn ia-H erzegovina 77 Guatemala 129 Mongolia 181 Sw itzerland
26 Botswana 78 Guinea 130 Morocco 182 Syrian A rab Repub lic
27 Braz il 79 Guinea-B issau 131 Mozambique 183 Ta jik is tan
28 Brune i 80 Guyana 132 Myanmar 184 Tanzan ia
29 Bulgaria 81 Haiti 1 33 N am ib ia 185 Thailand
30 Burkina Faso 82 Honduras 134 N epal 186 Togo
31 Burund i 83 Hong Kong, China 135 N etherlands 187 Tonga
32 Cambodia 84 Hungary 136 N etherlands Antille s 188 Trin idad and Tobago
33 Cameroon 85 Ice land 137 N ew Caledonia 189 Tunisia
34 Canada 86 India 138 N ew Zea land 190 Turkey
35 Cap e Verde 87 Indonesia 139 N icaragua 191 Turkmenis tan
36 Cayman Islands 88 Iran , Islam ic Rep . 140 N ig er 192 U ganda
37 Central A frican Rep . 89 Iraq 141 N ig eria 193 Ukraine
38 Chad 90 Ireland 142 N orthern M ariana Islands 194 United Arab Em irates
39 Channel Islands 91 Isle of Man 143 N orway 195 United K ingdom
40 Chile 92 Israe l 1 44 Oman 196 United States
41 China 93 Italy 145 Pakistan 197 U ruguay
42 Colombia 94 Jama ica 146 Palau 198 U zb ekistan
43 Comoros 95 Japan 147 Panama 199 Vanuatu
44 Congo , D em . Rep . 96 Jordan 148 Papua N ew Guinea 200 Venezuela, RB
45 Congo , Rep . 97 Kazakhstan 149 Paraguay 201 V ietnam
46 Costa R ica 98 Kenya 150 Peru 202 V irg in Is lands (U .S .)
47 Cote d ’Ivoire 99 K iribati 1 51 Philippines 203 West Bank and Gaza
48 Croa tia 100 Korea, D em . Rep . 152 Poland 204 Yemen, Rep .
49 Cuba 101 Korea, Rep. 153 Portugal 205 Yugos lavia , Fed. Rep .
50 Cyprus 102 Kuwait 154 Puerto R ico 206 Zambia
51 Czech Repub lic 103 Kyrgyz Repub lic 155 Q atar 207 Z imbabwe
52 Denmark 104 Lao PDR 156 Romania
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